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Abstract—The widespread use of digital video surveillance
systems has also increased the concerns for violation of privacy
rights. Since video surveillance systems are invasive, it is a
challenge to find an acceptable balance between privacy of
the public under surveillance and the functionalities of the
systems. Tools for protection of visual privacy available today
lack either all or some of the important properties such as
security of protected visual data, reversibility (ability to undo
privacy protection), simplicity, and independence from the video
encoding used. In this paper, we propose an algorithm based
on well-known warping techniques (common for animation and
artistic purposes) to obfuscate faces in video surveillance, aiming
to overcome these shortcomings. To demonstrate the feasibility
of such an approach, we apply warping algorithm to faces in a
standard Yale dataset and run face detection and recognition
algorithms on the resulted images. Experiments demonstrate
the tradeoff between warping strength and accuracy for both
detection and recognition.
Index Terms—Privacy protection, video surveillance, warping
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent rapid adoption of digital video surveillance systems,
especially in public spaces and communities, has significantly
increased the concern for protection of individual privacy.
Typical surveillance systems are non-discriminative, surveying
everyone and everything, which poses a threat to the human
rights, to privacy, and fundamental individual freedoms [1][2].
Growing number of privacy abuses and ignorance of privacy
laws increase the public tension preventing full acceptance
of surveillance systems. Many privacy advocates worry that
the abuses of video surveillance may outweigh its bene-
fits. Moreover, with the latest progress in video analytics
(detection, recognition, and tracking), in combination with
personal information from web and social networks (which is
more and more easily available), the emerging multi-modal
surveillance systems pose a serious threat to fundamental
rights to privacy. Therefore, there is a strong demand in user-
centric solutions [3], which specifically focus on protection of
privacy in video surveillance systems.
However, preserving privacy while performing surveillance
is challenging. Often, these goals contradict each other. Since
video surveillance systems are invasive by their design, it is
hard to find an acceptable balance between privacy of public
under surveillance and the surveillance tasks at hand, such
as detection of suspicious individuals, objects, and events. A
desired method for visual privacy protection would, therefore,
retain basic characteristics or integrity of visual data, i.e.,
a protected face would remain visible, but remove personal
information, i.e, specific facial features allowing to identify
an individual would be hidden. In addition, a practical privacy
protection method would have the following properties: (i)
low complexity (easy to use), (ii) reversibility (possibility to
undo protection), (iii) flexibility of application (independent
of compression and video or image data format), (iv) security
(recovery of the original data using secret key), and (v)
variable strength granularity (flexibility to protect data with
different degrees of strength).
Although many different privacy protection methods have
been proposed for preserving privacy while retaining the
surveillance objective, none of them fulfill all above mentioned
properties. Such simple methods like blurring, pixelization,
and masking are not reversible and insecure; encryption-based
methods, such as proposed in [4] are secure but destroy
integrity of the original pixel data; scrambling [5] is dependent
on video or image compression; and anonymization methods
like in [6] are often complex and require original data to be
stored separately.
To overcome such shortcomings, we propose using a geo-
metrical transformation (or warping) for protection of visual
privacy. Pixels in the protected region can be shifted into
slightly different locations, thus destroying visual details and
relationships between neighboring pixels of an image. Hence,
the balance between privacy protection and surveillance task is
transformed into how much the pixels in an image are warped.
To keep complexity low, we propose estimating warping
transformation matrix based on the grid of key pixels that
are shifted to a random distance. The rest of the pixels are
warped using the estimated matrix, while the resulted gaps are
interpolated with bicubic algorithm. Such approach allows us
to distort the specific information while retaining the general
shapes of the region, and the degree of distortion can be
adjusted by changing the shifting distance of the key pixels.
The number of key pixels characterizes the complexity of the
algorithm. Since warping is applied to pixel data, it is inde-
pendent to compression. A security can be insured by using
a secret key for seeding a pseudo-random algorithm, as well
as, for encryption of the key pixels used for transformation
matrix estimation. Unwarping can be done by applying the
inverse transformation matrix.
We demonstrate feasibility of the proposed warping method
by applying it to faces of a standard Yale face dataset (see
Figure 1), since faces are among the most privacy sensitive
regions. Location of each face is first detected with Viola-
Jones [7] face detection algorithm. A grid of key pixels, used
as a base for the warping transformation, is constructed from
detected eyes, nose, and mouth. We then run face detection
and face recognition (Fisher linear discriminant analysis) algo-
rithms on the warped faces to determine whether the warping
preserves the integrity of a face, such that the accuracy of a
face detection algorithm is not affected by it, and whether the
specific personal features are distorted, such that recognition
accuracy is decreased. In an ideal scenario, a protected face
would be detected by the detection algorithm but would not
be recognized by the recognition algorithm.
In the next section, we discuss the related work on exist-
ing methods for visual privacy protection, emphasizing their
advantages and disadvantages. In Section III, we give an
overview of the proposed warping method and experiments
conducted. In Section IV, we present the experimental results
and discuss our findings. We conclude the paper with Sec-
tion V.
II. RELATED WORK
Many approaches aiming to protect personal privacy in
surveillance video distort, remove, or hide visual information,
which can be used for personal identification. These techniques
are different in terms of complexity (easy-to-use), effectiveness
of the privacy protection (how hard to identify a protected
person), reversibility (possibility to undo protection), usage
flexibility (can be used with compressed or uncompressed
video), etc. We review some of them in this section. Since
visible identifiable face is a major threat to privacy in video
surveillance, many researchers have focused on face de-
identification techniques.
One way to preserve privacy of individuals under video
surveillance is to make their facial information unintelligible
by distorting the corresponding pixels, such that it would
prevent face recognition techniques or human observers to
identify persons. Such approaches include replacement of
faces in a video frame with some simple shapes or pixeliza-
tion. For instance, in [8] people’s identities are protected by
obscuring their face with a colored ellipse. The authors argue
that such protection allows observation of the people actions in
full details while hiding their identity. Other naı¨ve approaches
also include blurring and face masking for hiding the faces of
the people in the video. These types of techniques are simple
to implement in video or images, making them popular to use
for hiding personal identities and other private information on
TV, in social networks, or other potentially privacy infringing
internet services. However, these type of filters irreversibly
distorts video data at the pixel level, making it impossible to
use video in situations, when, for example, due to a court
order, identity of a person in the video needs to be retrieved.
Arguing that de-identification of faces is not enough for
an adequate privacy protection, the technique for obscuring
of the whole body silhouette is proposed in [9], which is
based on the edge and motion model. Going further, in [6]
and [10] it is proposed to completely remove the silhouette
of the moving person from the scene to hide its identity.
Both approaches rely on RFID tags for pinpointing of the
people locations, with [10] focusing on an efficient inpainting
algorithm and encrypting the removed silhouette inside the
original video bitstream. Similar to the previously described
face de-identification methods, obscuring or removal of silhou-
ettes distorts an original data content, which is not suitable in
many surveillance applications. One way to solve this problem
is to extract and transmit these silhouettes via separate secure
channels to an observer authorized to view privacy related
information.
Aiming to avoid constraints of the distortion-based methods,
more advanced scrambling-based privacy filters are proposed
in [5] and [11]. These techniques are based on randomized
(seeded with a secret key) modifications of the compressed
video stream encoded as a series of JPEG and JPEG 2000
images. Conditional access control techniques are proposed
in [5] to scramble ROIs, e.g., corresponding to people or
faces. The scrambling is applied either in wavelet-domain
or codestream-domain. In [11], code-blocks corresponding to
ROI are trimmed down to the lowest quality layer of the
codestream. Subsequently, the quality of the ROI can be
decreased by limiting the video bit rate.
Two efficient region-based transform-domain and
codestream-domain scrambling techniques are proposed
in [12] to hide privacy-sensitive information in MPEG-4
compressed video. In the first approach, the sign of selected
transform coefficients is pseudo-randomly inverted during
encoding. In the second approach, bits of the codestream
are pseudo-randomly flipped after encoding. In [13], the
region-based transform-domain scrambling is extended to
H.264/AVC. In particular, to discriminate between scrambled
and unscrambled regions, the technique exploits the Flexible
Macroblock Ordering (FMO) mechanism of H.264/AVC to
define two slice groups composed of Macroblocks (MB)
corresponding to the foreground and background respectively.
The main advantage of scrambling-based privacy protection
techniques is that they are reversible. By knowing a secret key,
which could be stored and transmitted securely, one can de-
code the video back to undistorted state. Another advantage is
that the appearance of the scrambled region is not completely
distorted, making the viewing experience less distractive (com-
pared to a black box instead of a region for instance). However,
scrambling-based filters require high processing power. Also,
since scrambling modifies the specific internal coefficients of a
given compression algorithm, a separate scrambling tool needs
to be designed and implemented for every video encoder and
decoder used.
Another way to protect a sensitive region securely is to
encrypt it. With Privacy through Invertible Cryptographic
Obscuration (PICO) proposed in [4], data corresponding to
faces is encrypted in order to conceal identity. The process
is reversible for authorized users in possession of a secret
encryption key. In other words, it does not undermine the
objective of surveillance, as a subject can still be identified
by decrypting the face, provided an appropriate warrant is
issued. Similarly, a permutation-based encryption technique
in the pixel domain is introduced in [14]. TrustCam is
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Fig. 1: Examples of warping and unwarping for different faces and different levels of warping strength. Green dots in Figure (b)
are original locations of key pixel grid, and blue dots are these pixels randomly shifted.
presented in [15], which is a video camera with onboard
hardware security solution Trusted Platform Module (TMP),
which implements trusted computing. This built-in chip allows
establishing secure connection between cameras and observing
stations, as well as applying SHA-1 based encryption to the
sensitive regions, such as faces and license plates.
The idea of encrypting or scrambling face regions was
developed further by [16], where the authors focus on the
compression blocks based encryption mechanism. The authors
argue that the conventional encryption methods are not suitable
due to the real-time constraints, limited computational and
network resources. Instead, they suggest adding a special
parameter inside an encoder compression block, which would
enable encryption and secret key generation.
Rahman et al. [17] also argue that conventional encryp-
tion mechanisms, such as RSA, are ineffective (too slow,
complex key-exchange mechanism, etc.) for encryption of
large amount of data such as ROIs in video. The authors
propose to scramble ROIs using Chaos cryptography. Chaos-
based encryption generates pseudo-random numbers with one
initial secret seed (that both scrambling and de-scrambling
algorithms must share) and masks (replaces) the original data
with these numbers, which makes it relatively simpler on the
large amounts of data.
As the last two methods ([16] and [17]) imply, encryption
is a computationally heavy operation, and it is especially
challenging when used in video streams in real-time video
surveillance systems. Also, these privacy protection methods
render encrypted regions as boxes of white noise instead of
the meaningful features, which may hinder the ability of the
observer to perform the required surveillance tasks.
III. PROPOSED METHOD AND EXPERIMENTS OVERVIEW
Developing appropriate privacy protection for video surveil-
lance systems is a challenging problem. By proposing warping
based privacy protection approach, we aimed to overcome the
shortcomings of such advanced visual privacy protection tools
like scrambling and encryption. Both classes of methods are
secure and flexible, but while encryption replaces a protected
region with white noise, scrambling, in order to work, requires
heavy modification of a compression encoder. Since warping
is a mere geometrical transformation of pixels, which means
pixels are simply shifted and their intensities are interpolated,
it is compression independent, as opposed to scrambling. Also,
unlike encryption, warping can preserve (depending on the
strength level) general facial features and likeness of a face.
We use standard Yale dataset with provided ground truth
for testing the feasibility of proposed warping-based privacy
protection. Warping is applied automatically to faces that
are detected with Viola-Jones face detection [7] algorithm
implemented in OpenCV1.
Warping algorithm is done as following (with unwarping
being the same algorithm inversely applied to the warped
1http://opencv.willowgarage.com/wiki/
image):
• Select a set of key points in the image
• Randomly shift these points (i.e., change their coor-
dinates) by adding or substracting random value with
weight depending on the warping strength. The resulted
coordinates constitute the desired destinations for the
selected point in the target warped image.
• Based on the original and destination coordinates of the
key point, compute transformation matrix.
• Apply the transformation to each pixel in the image, using
’cubic’ interpolation.
For estimation of the transform matrix, we first construct
a grid of key pixels from automatically detected (with the
same algorithm that is used for face detection) eyes, nose,
and mouth. Several points around each detected facial feature
are picked, as well as, the sides of the face (see Figure 1b
for illustration). These grid points are locally shifted to the
distance generated by pseudo-random algorithm. The maximal
possible shifting distance represents how strong the warping
effect is, as illustrated by Figure 1a (mild effect) and Figure 1c
(extremely strong effect).
Since in different images faces have different sizes in pixels,
the value of distance should depend on the size of a given
face. Hence the choice of appropriate distance is important
and non-trivial. In our experiments, we varied the distance
proportionally to the size of the eye in the face (which is one
fifth of facial width, according to standard head proportions).
Original locations of the grid pixels are mapped using bicubic
interpolation to the shifted locations, thus determining the
transformation matrix. The transformation matrix is applied
to the rest of the pixels in a face using ’remap’ function
implemented in OpenCV with bicubic interpolation.
In a surveillance scenario, when a protected face needs
to be recovered, an unwarping operation is applied. If the
transformation matrix is known, the original face can be
estimated from warped data by applying the inverse transform.
The challenge with warping transformation is that most of
the pixels in the warped image are interpolated between the
transformed key points on the grid. Interpolation results in
a crude estimation of the pixels’ locations and intensities.
Applying the reverse operation (unwarping) to the warped
pixels increases an approximation error further, resulting in
an unwarped image that is an estimation of the original.
The stronger the warping, the higher estimation error, as
demonstrated by Figures 1c and Figures 1f, where unwarping
could not recover the original face.
To evaluate the proposed warping algorithm, we run face
detection (Viola-Jones algorithm) and face recognition (Fisher
linear discriminant analysis) algorithms, both of which are
implemented in OpenCV library, on the warped faces from
the Yale dataset. The aim of the experiments is to determine
whether the warping preserves the generic features of a face,
such that the accuracy of a face detection algorithm is not
affected by it, and whether the specific personal features
are distorted, such that recognition accuracy is decreased.
In an ideal scenario, a protected face would be detected by
the detection algorithm but would not be recognized by the
recognition algorithm.
Since the choice of the distance to which the pixels are
warped determines the strength of warping, it is important to
find an appropriate distance for a given application scenario.
Therefore, in our experiments, we varied the strength of
warping by changing the maximal distance to which the grid
key pixels can be shifted. The strength level is inversely
proportional to the size of an eye in the detected face. The
larger the strength level, the smaller the distance to which the
pixels are shifted and smaller the warping effect. The smaller
the strength level, the larger such distance and stronger the
warping effect.
We vary the strength level of warping from 1 (maximally
strong warping) to 15 (minimal warping effect). To find
detection accuracy, for each strength level, the number of
detected faces is recorded. Using available ground truth, we
obtain the number of correctly detected faces and divide it by
the recorded total number of faces to get the detection index,
which is the measure of accuracy for face detection.
For face recognition, for each warping strength level,
we compute rank one of cumulative match characteristic
(CMC) [18], which is a standard measure of accuracy for
identification task of face recognition algorithm. In such iden-
tification task, images in gallery have faces that are assumed
to be known at the moment of recognition and images in probe
set contain faces that are being recognized by the algorithm.
We assume original unchanged images to constitute a gallery
set. Probe set would then consist of warped (in scenario when
protection is ’on’) and unwarped (when protection is removed)
images. Since warping algorithm randomly shifts pixels in
images, to avoid bias in our recognition results, we generated
5 sets of warped and unwarped images from Yale dataset and
ran recognition algorithm 5 times. The overall result is the
average of recognition accuracies for all the 5 runs.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experimental results for Viola-Jones [7] face detection
algorithm are presented in Figure 2. X axis shows the strength
of the applied warping with smaller value leading to stronger
warping and higher value resulting in less warping effect
(see Figure 1 for illustration). Note that the detection accu-
racy for the unwarped images with strength level 15 is the
same as for the original images, when no warping/unwarping
transformation is applied. Figure 2 demonstrates that face
detection algorithm detects equally accurately both warped and
unwarped faces, with a little gap appearing at warping strength
level 5, until the rapid decrease in accuracy starting with level
2. It means that until faces are distorted to the level similar to
Figure 1b and Figure 1e, the face detection performs well.
Similarly for the face recognition algorithm [19], recogni-
tion results for different strength of warped/unwarped images
are shown in Figure 3. Recognition accuracy for the unwarped
images with strength level 15 is the same as recognition
accuracy for the original images, when no warping/unwarping
transformation is applied. Recognition accuracy of the warped


















Fig. 2: Accuracy of face detection for different strengths of
warped and unwarped images.





















Fig. 3: Accuracy of face recognition for different strengths of
warped and unwarped images.
images is lower than for original and decreases rapidly as
warping strength increases. This rapid drop in recognition
accuracy for warped images means that warping strength has
a strong affect on the recognition algorithm distorting the fine
details that allow more accurate recognition.
Unwarping on the other hand managed to recover those
features maintaining the recognition accuracy unchanged until
warping strength 9. Although, it would be preferable that the
accuracy for unwarped images would continue being high for
even stronger warping strength, but, as discussed in the previ-
ous section, the approximating nature of unwarping algorithm
introduces large enough errors, preventing it to recover original
images when strong level of warping is used.
However, the strong gap between ’warped’ and ’unwarped’
curves for the strength levels above 8 show that the warp-
ing/unwarping algorithm can be successfully used in practical,
especially given a more realistic and challenging dataset for
recognition compared to Yale dataset. The overall high recog-
nition accuracy demonstrated by the algorithm (even for high
warping strength levels) can be explained due to its robustness
to the high distortion levels, as also supported by [20].
These results motivate us to (i) perform subjective eval-
uations of warping privacy protection using human subjects
to see whether the subjective recognition rate is similarly
high as accuracy of recognition algorithm, and (ii) refine our
warping approach to improve the approximation accuracy of
the unwarping recovery method, which will increase the gap
between warped and unwarped recognition curves in Figure 3.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a new warping-based visual
privacy protection algorithm for video surveillance systems.
Warping is an effective approach for privacy protection, be-
cause of its simplicity, flexibility of application and degree of
strength, and how it distorts local pixel information preserving
the general likeness of a warped object. We evaluated the
warping based privacy protection algorithm on the standard
Yale faces dataset.
Experiments demonstrate the tradeoff between warping
strength and accuracy for both detection and recognition
algorithms. The results also show that despite high robust-
ness of the face recognition algorithm, recognition accuracy
decreases after a certain warping strength is achieved, while
detection accuracy does not change. This pivotal point can be
used in practical surveillance applications, since warping with
this strength retains the likeness of a face, while distorting
fine details and features that contain information allowing to
identify a person.
These results motivate us to (i) perform subjective eval-
uations of warping privacy protection using human subjects
to see whether the subjective recognition rate is similarly
high as accuracy of recognition algorithm, and (ii) refine our
warping approach to improve the approximation accuracy of
the unwarping recovery method.
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